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Abstract
The paper offers an analysis of how an energy-monitoring system was implemented and eventually adopted by the crew 
members in a shipping company. It illustrates how the social process of enacting the system as a collaborative technology-
in-practice, enabling a significant reduction in energy consumption, was contingent on the negotiation of meaning and 
mutual learning among crew members in their community of practice. The case study contributes to the literature on the 
relation between information technology, organization and energy efficiency by investigating the socially situated nature of 
technology implementation and work practice change. The findings’ implications for the role of information technology in 
improving energy efficiency in shipping are discussed.
Keywords Energy efficiency · Maritime operation · Energy monitoring · Information systems · Communities of practice · 
Technology-in-practice
1 Introduction
The environmental impact attributed to shipping is signif-
icant. Emitting over 940 million tons of  CO2 every year, 
maritime transport accounts for around 2.5% of the total 
annual anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The 
large techno-economical potential for improving energy effi-
ciency in shipping has been demonstrated in several research 
studies (Bouman et al. 2017). The discrepancy, often called 
the energy efficiency gap, between the actual and potential 
level of energy efficiency, has been conceptualized and 
explained in terms of a number of different barriers within 
the behavioral, organizational and institutional levels of the 
shipping sector (Acciaro et al. 2013; Dewan et al. 2018; 
Johnson and Andersson 2014; Rehmatulla and Smith 2015). 
One of the allegedly most detrimental barriers is the lack 
of valid and reliable information on energy consumption. 
Consequentially, information on the potential improvements 
in energy efficiency related to the various available technical 
and operational measures is often not available (Jafarzadeh 
and Utne 2014; Poulsen and Johnson 2016). This, in turn, 
has been demonstrated to be partly affected by shortcom-
ings in energy management including insufficient practices 
and technologies related to energy performance monitoring 
(Armstrong and Banks 2015; Johnson et al. 2014).
The need for better energy management and energy 
monitoring has been recognized by the International Mari-
time Organization (IMO). It is now mandatory for shipping 
companies to implement energy management and establish 
monitoring practices on all ships “to evaluate the effective-
ness of the planned measures”, “deepen the understanding 
on the overall characteristics of the ship’s operation” and 
“comprehend the trend of the efficiency improvement” (IMO 
2016, p. 7).
However, energy-monitoring systems, arguably necessary 
for effective energy management, are still rare in shipping 
companies. Many still collect data on energy consumption 
manually, with the standard practice being that chief officers 
in navigation or engine departments send in consumption 
reports to the shore organization once a day but rarely get 
any feedback from shore. This has been reported to lead to 
a lack of transparency, data misreporting and lack of trust 
and support of energy consumption-monitoring policies, 
resulting in insufficient awareness and engagement on part 
of the crews (Poulsen and Johnson 2016; Poulsen and Sornn-
Friese 2015). Moreover, the lack of auto-logging systems, 
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collection of real-time data, and the non-use of computer 
applications, allowing statistical analysis of energy con-
sumption and other relevant parameters, “prevents deci-
sion makers at sea and onshore from making adequate and 
prompt changes in ship operations to save fuel” (Poulsen 
and Johnson 2016, p. 3792). To enhance energy efficiency 
in ship operations, information on the energy consumed 
during different operational phases (cargo loading, maneu-
vering, navigation) needs thus to be made widely available 
for managers on shore and crew members at sea (Lützen 
et al. 2017). It has been argued that more information will 
enable increased awareness, better decisions and planning 
which will consequentially “allow onshore fleet managers 
and crews to immediately identify and realize cost-effective 
fuel saving initiatives […] and adjust behaviour accordingly” 
(Poulsen and Johnson 2016, p. 3790). One reason making 
the dearth of information a particularly challenging problem 
is the complexity of ship energy consumption. Ships have 
numerous energy consumers (for propulsion, accommoda-
tion, cargo handling), they operate under highly variable 
conditions (weather, sea, routes, maintenance and loading) 
and they differ fundamentally in terms of design (size, speed, 
complexity and type of cargoes carried). Numerous factors 
thus influence the fuel consumption of a ship, which often 
varies significantly during and between voyages. This com-
plexity, including the lack of knowledge on the ship and 
route specificity of energy consumption, makes it particu-
larly difficult for crews to learn and develop optimal work 
practices (Rasmussen et al. 2018; Viktorelius and Lundh 
2019). Implementation and use of information technology 
to monitor energy use is thus critical for efficient operations.
However, as pointed out by Jafarzadeh and Utne (2014, 
p. 611), a “common misconception” is that “the mere instal-
lation of equipment saves fuel”. This view is aligned with 
a wide-spread idea in the energy research literature, often 
referred to as the information deficit model, according to 
which seemingly irrational behavior (not saving energy) can 
be explained by the lack of adequate information on energy 
consumption. It builds, however, on the criticized assump-
tion that simply having access to more valid and reliable 
information will reduce energy consumption (Hargreaves 
2018; Moezzi and Janda 2014; Owens and Driffill 2008). 
While equipment, such as measurement instruments may 
be installed onboard ships, there is no guarantee that they 
become utilized or effective in changing practices, which is 
essentially contingent on the adoption process within ship-
ping companies. The affordances of any information sys-
tem in facilitating improved energy practices in shipping can 
be argued to depend on both the materiality of technology 
(allowing real-time energy consumption measurement), and 
the social system of work and interaction. However, while 
the literature of energy monitoring and feedback in organi-
zation and work has focused on demonstrating the effect of 
monitoring on energy consumption behavior (Carrico and 
Riemer 2011; Dixon et al. 2015; Murtagh et al. 2013), few 
studies have addressed the social process of implementa-
tion and use of monitoring technologies. Kitada and Olcer 
(2015) suggest, for instance, that since policies and proce-
dures are normally introduced from a shore-based office and 
then enforced on ships, it is important to investigate how 
ship crews adopt energy management technologies in their 
routines of work. They further note that since “it is com-
monly acknowledged that onboard crew tends to experience 
a gap in their perceptions of routine work on board when 
the shore-based managers try to enforce new policies and 
procedures into the ship” (Kitada and Olcer 2015, p. 38), it 
is particularly important to investigate how the visions and 
strategies of energy monitoring are shared, communicated, 
and promoted amongst ship crew members.
In this paper, these research gaps, regarding the organi-
zational process of implementing information systems 
designed for facilitating energy monitoring in shipping, are 
addressed. Two research questions guided the study reported 
in this paper:
How are energy monitoring technologies adopted by crew 
members?
How can energy monitoring technologies improve the 
capacity to make better operational decisions during maneu-
vering and navigation?
The interpretative case study reported in this paper used a 
qualitative methodology to investigate how an energy-moni-
toring system installed onboard the ships in a shipping com-
pany was enacted as a legitimate artefact in the community 
of practice of the crew members through a process of situ-
ated learning, negotiation of meaning and mutual engage-
ment (cf. Wenger 1998). As a result of this community and 
work-based adoption of the monitoring system, the company 
managed to reduce its annual fuel consumption with 20%, 
representing the ‘same amount of fuel it would require to 
propel one of their ships 2.5 laps around the globe’. This 
paper draws on the practice-based literature (Corradi et al. 
2010; Nicolini 2012) to investigate and conceptualize the 
adoption and use of energy-monitoring systems in the ship-
ping company.
2  Theoretical background
Research on the relation between information technol-
ogy and organizational change has shown that the capac-
ity of information technology to change routines and work 
practices is dependent on practitioners’ situated actions 
(Orlikowski 1996) and social construction of the technol-
ogy (Leonardi and Barley 2010). In the research field called 
workplace studies (Heath et al. 2000; Heath and Luff 2000; 
Luff et al. 2000), numerous studies have illustrated how 
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technologies are constituted through and inseparable from 
the specifically situated practices of their use (Suchman 
et al. 1999). This has primarily meant that the traditionally 
supported idea that “the technical and social world operate 
according to rules that are prior to any particular situation” 
(Jackson et al. 2002, p. 239) and that technologies predict 
and determine organizational structure, is now out of fashion 
(Nicolini 2006; Orlikowski and Scott 2008). There is instead 
a widespread recognition that the success of technologies 
in improving work, and, e.g., making organizations more 
efficient, depends “on the extent to which they [technolo-
gies] resonate with their local contexts of use” and “in mak-
ing technologies ‘at home’ in their very practical worlds of 
work” (Hindmarsh et al. 2007, 5).
The thesis that technology-induced organizational change 
is an effect of social construction, that “emerges from an 
ongoing stream of social action in which people respond to 
a technology’s constraints and affordances” (Leonardi and 
Barley 2010, p. 1), has been prominently expressed in the 
research stream known as the practice-based approach (Bar-
ley 1986; Boudreau and Robey 2005; Chu and Robey 2008; 
Gherardi 2010; Orlikowski 1992; Rivera and Cox 2014; 
Vaast and Walsham 2005). From this perspective human 
agency (rather than institutional structures or technological 
features) is given a prominent role in explaining social order 
(Leonardi 2011).
Most studies taking a practice approach to technology 
base their theoretical framework on the work of Wanda 
Orlikowski (2000). From the perspective developed by 
Orlikowski (2000) social and organization structures (e.g., 
rules and resources guiding the management of energy) are 
not embodied in technology, neither are they determined by 
managerial imperatives or policies, but emerge from being 
enacted in practice by the people performing their work in 
everyday situations (Brown and Duguid 1991; Orr 1996). 
Technologies are not attributed any generally predictable 
consequences independently from the social context in 
which they are adopted and used (Feldman and Orlikowski 
2011). While technological artefacts are designed with 
certain symbolic and material features affording certain 
uses, they are still open-ended before (and after) they are 
instantiated in activity, i.e., before they become technolo-
gies-in-practice: institutionalized and embodied ways of 
using technologies and organizing work in specific contexts 
(Orlikowski 2000). From this perspective, it follows that 
whether any energy-monitoring system enables and facili-
tates energy management in a company and contributes to 
it becoming sustainable, essentially depends on how it is 
enacted in practice.
Although the practice perspective has made a signifi-
cant contribution to our theoretical understanding of the 
social nature of technology and the role it plays in consti-
tuting practice, few empirical studies have explored how 
technologies become enrolled in practice. Barley (1986) 
showed how the introduction of identical CT scanners in 
two radiology departments resulted in divergent forms of 
organization. Orlikowski (2000) illustrated how a particular 
system was enacted differently in different sites and organi-
zations by the technicians and consultants using the system. 
Chu and Robey (2008) investigated why the enactment of 
an e-learning technology declined over time. However, less 
attention has been directed at how technologies become part 
of the enacted structures guiding action in the first place. 
And more importantly, why are new technologies often 
rejected by practitioners? A hint to the answer can be found 
in a paragraph by Orlikowski:
A community of users engaged in similar work prac-
tices typically enacts similar technologies-in-practice, 
where through common training sessions, shared 
socialization, comparable on-the-job experiences, and 
mutual coordination and storytelling, users come to 
engage with a technology in similar ways. Over time, 
through repeated reinforcement by the community of 
users, such technologies-in-practice may become rei-
fied and institutionalized, at which point they become 
treated as predetermined and firm prescriptions for 
social action, and as such, may impede change (2000, 
p. 411).
It is argued in this paper that the emphasis on communi-
ties of practice, and its related concept of negotiation of 
meaning and learning is key in understanding how technolo-
gies become adopted in practice, or why they are not. The 
next section reviews the notion of communities of practice 
(Lave and Wenger 1991; Wenger 1998) and indicates its 
relevance for understanding the emergence of energy-mon-
itoring systems as technologies-in-practice.
2.1  Enacting new technologies in communities 
of practice
Work practice do not exist in the abstract but tend to develop 
within particular communities of professionals, such as those 
of claim processors’ (Wenger 1998) or ship officers’ (Hutch-
ins 1995). It is within communities of practice that practi-
tioners “organize their work with their colleagues” to “get 
the job done” and “fulfil the requirements of their employers 
and clients” (Wenger 1998, p. 6). Practices are, according to 
Wenger, first and foremost a process “by which we experi-
ence the world and our engagement with it as meaningful” 
(Wenger 1998, p. 51). The process, described as a negotia-
tion of meaning, is conceived to involve both participation 
(meaningful social interaction in some activity) and reifica-
tion (production and use of objects manifesting, or giving 
form to, those experiences of meaningfulness).
 Cognition, Technology & Work
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Technologies-in-practice, being examples of both the pro-
cess and outcome of a negotiation of meaning in communi-
ties of practice, can thus be seen as involving both reification 
and participation. They are enactments that emerge through 
participation and, at the same time, concrete “points of focus 
around which the negotiation of meaning becomes organ-
ized” (Wenger 1998, p. 58). Some attempts at reification do 
not originate in communities of practice, as is often the case 
when a company decides to implement a new technology in 
a work setting. However, to become meaningful parts of a 
practice (forms of reification and participation), technologies 
have to be re-appropriated into the local communities of 
practice. To understand adoption and use of new technolo-
gies it is, therefore, necessary to look closer at the constitu-
tion of communities of practice.
Communities of practice are held together by mutual 
engagement where members negotiate the meaning of their 
actions. Through this collective process of negotiation and 
interaction, a sense of a joint enterprise is created. Although 
every work practice is situated in a broader organizational 
and institutional context, with its particular requirements, 
constraints and resources, communities of practice are not 
determined by these conditions but respond to them and thus 
define the enterprise. The impact of an external force, such 
as the decision of a manager or the implementation of a new 
technology is thus always mediated by the community’s own 
production of practice (Orr 1996). Rather than only being 
controlled from the outside, communities of practice have 
their own mechanisms for internal discipline. The nego-
tiation of a joint enterprise gives rise to norms of mutual 
accountability among the participants including a sense of 
“what matters and what does not, what is important and 
why it is important, what to do and not to do, what to pay 
attention to and what to ignore[…]when action and arte-
facts are good enough and when they need improvement or 
refinement” (Wenger 1998, p. 81). Another source of coher-
ence in communities of practice is the development of a 
shared repertoire, consisting of the activities, routines, ways 
of doing things, symbols, technologies and artefacts which 
have become a part of the practice. Established communities 
of practice may be difficult to change precisely because they 
constitute regimes of competence, tool-use and interaction. 
Technologies-in-practice are, therefore, structures that may 
be hard to break down or change.
Communities of practice form boundaries and discontinu-
ities between those that have been participating in the com-
munity’s shared histories and those that have not. Becoming 
a legitimate member and a fully participating insider of an 
established community of practice takes time and is often 
a slow and gradual process (Lave and Wenger 1991). To be 
contributing to the actual development of practice and the 
enactment of technology, the person needs to be (at least 
a partial) member of the community, i.e., participating in 
its everyday reproduction. Outsiders often have a hard time 
influencing the direction of a practice, and peripheral mem-
bers are seldom allowed to significantly influence or change 
the practice. Consequentially, practices change primarily 
from the inside. Boundaries not only affect humans, they 
can also block artefacts from entering a practice as well if 
they are not perceived as legitimate elements of the joint 
enterprise and shared repertoire. Adoption of new technol-
ogy has thus to be sanctioned by the core members of a 
community of practice.
Moreover, the development of practice and the enactment 
of new technologies-in-practice (adoption of new technol-
ogy) are inextricably connected to learning (Boudreau and 
Robey 2005). From Lave and Wenger’s socio-cultural per-
spective, learning is seen as a fundamentally situated pro-
cess, a collective negotiation of meaning and an interplay 
between the established regimes of competence and new 
experience. Learning is thus not seen as a purely cognitive 
act, a “transmission of explicit, abstract knowledge from the 
head of someone who knows to the head of someone who 
does not” (Brown and Duguid 1991, p. 47). Instead, learning 
is a process in which practitioners may renegotiate the mean-
ing of old or new technology in their practice by engagement 
and participation, tuning the definition of their enterprise or 
expanding their collective repertoire. Adopting new tech-
nologies and changing practices requires renegotiating the 
meaning of the joint enterprise and shared repertoire through 
mutual engagement and interaction.
It is suggested here that for new technologies, such as 
energy-monitoring systems, to become adopted by practi-
tioners in a particular community of practice the artefact has 
to be enacted as a legitimate and meaningful element in the 
joint enterprise and shared repertoire. Adopting new tech-
nologies is a dual process of reification and participation: 
it involves rendering (reifying) the symbolic and material 
properties into meaningful elements in the joint enterprise 
and shared repertoire in the community of practice. It is 
suggested that this expansion of practice involves situated 
learning in which the meaning of the technology (its symbol 
and material properties) and the experience of using it is 
negotiated through a social process of mutual engagement 
among the practitioners within communities of practice.
3  Research setting and methods
This article draws upon a field study conducted in a Swedish 
shipping company owned by a larger international corpo-
ration within the transportation industry focusing on pub-
lic transport. The shipping company owns 16 vessels and 
charters two, with an individual ship capacity of around 
200–400 passengers. The shipping company uses the ships 
to provide their service for a local transportation company 
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owned by the regional municipality responsible for deliver-
ing public transportation to the citizens. The service deliv-
ered is primarily to transport passengers between several 
islands within an archipelago and the city located on the 
mainland. The company was purposely chosen for the case 
study because it was known for having reduced its fuel con-
sumption by 20% as a result of installing a fuel-monitoring 
system onboard its ships and had thus demonstrated that 
significant improvements in operational energy efficiency 
could be made without large investments. The organizational 
process that the company, and in particular the officers work-
ing on the ships, had experienced was, therefore, consid-
ered to be a valuable case to study to better understand how 
energy-monitoring information systems are adopted by crew 
members and how they may enhance the everyday opera-
tional practices in shipping.
Data collection was based on semi-structured interviews 
with 12 bridge officers working on 6 different ships, supple-
mented by observation of work carried out by the officers 
(maneuvering, navigation, maintenance). The interviews and 
observations took place between February and April 2018. 
The interviewees were encouraged to retrospectively elabo-
rate on the events that took place during the implementation 
process of the monitoring system 2 years before the study 
as well as on the current use of it. This was done to be able 
to capture and interpret the temporally meaningful narrated 
episodes of the introduction of the system and the broader 
issue of energy saving related to their work (Flick 2000; 
Moezzi et al. 2017). The interviews onboard the ships often 
lasted several hours (on average 3 h) as they were entangled 
with the observations during the voyages. The observations 
focused on how the system was used in practice and on the 
methods of saving energy during ordinary work that had 
been developed as a result of using the system. In addition to 
the observations and the interviews with the officers onboard 
the ships, one semi-structured interview was also held with a 
representative of the shore organization: the environmental 
manager. The manager had been responsible for introducing 
the system onboard and had appeared in public (conferences 
and media) speaking about the company and its environmen-
tal work. The researcher also attended a full day workshop 
that the company held with their employees covering topics 
related to sustainability and eco-shipping.
The recorded and later transcribed interviews and field-
work notes were analyzed using a theoretically inspired the-
matic analysis to find repeated patterns or themes across 
the dataset pertaining to the research questions (Braun 
and Clarke 2006). Although the analysis was theoretically 
driven (by the practice-based approach to information sys-
tems), rather than purely inductive, the analytical process 
was recursive in the sense that the practice-theoretical 
framework used for analysis was continually re-fitted to the 
themes emerging in the progressively coded data until a 
stable conceptual mapping was achieved between the theo-
retical and empirical parts of the study (Dubois and Gadde 
2002). In the final step of writing up the analysis, the themes 
were re-embedded into an analytical narrative of how the 
energy-monitoring system was implemented in the shipping 
company.
3.1  Introducing the energy‑monitoring system 
into the ship officers’ communities of practice
In 2010, the shipping company in this study decided to initi-
ate a project to increase the operational energy efficiency in 
the fleet. This initiative was part of a larger effort of ‘tak-
ing their responsibility’ and becoming a more sustainable 
company, where eco-shipping and eco-driving, in particular, 
was considered to play a crucial part. Convinced that a sub-
stantial portion of the fuel consumption in the company was 
directly influenced by how officers performed their work and 
by “psychological factors”, or what “is in the head of ship 
officers”, the environmental manger wanted to find a tool 
with which to facilitate officers’ awareness about energy in 
everyday work. A decision was made to invest money in 
a digital ‘energy monitoring system’ (EMS) that could be 
used both onboard by officers and on shore by managers to 
monitor and analyze fuel consumption. The argument for 
the investment was that if the energy consumption associ-
ated with the work practices could be more clearly visible 
then an automatic reduction in energy use would follow. 
Before the implementation of the EMS, fuel consumption 
was analyzed once a month by managers on shore and ship 
officers only got the feedback on how much had been con-
sumed on occasional meetings a couple of times every year 
or presented in reports few had time to read. The invisibility 
of the consumption of energy made it difficult, for both man-
agers and officers, to detect any patterns or relations between 
particular operational practices and energy consumption. 
Consequently, any improvement or change in work prac-
tices was difficult to achieve with such sporadic feedback. 
As expressed by the environmental manager:
Before the system we could only guess the reasons for 
differences in fuel consumption, we needed a system to 
track and analyze the causes. You cannot change your 
behavior if you get the feedback a month too late. It 
needs to be real-time and it’s the person doing the work 
that needs the direct stimuli (Environmental manager).
The company purchased a system, described by its 
designers as “the ultimate tool on board for the crew to 
reduce and take control of the ship’s energy consumption 
in real time”, and installed it on two of their ships. The sys-
tem consisted of two interconnected subsystems; one online 
analysis tool and one onboard real-time monitoring display. 
The online tool could be used for following up and analyzing 
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fuel consumption of individual ships or the whole fleet. Cen-
tralized internet servers continuously recorded information 
about fuel consumption, position, speed and several other 
parameters. The collected data could be selected and re-pre-
sented in many different ways: statistical functions could, 
for instance, be used to generate graphs presenting different 
vessel parameters at specific time frames while also showing 
the geographical location of the vessels at a particular point 
in time; different routes or different trips on the same route 
could be compared; a ‘correlation report’ presenting a graph 
that showed the correlation between multiple parameters 
such as speed over ground and litres per nautical miles could 
also be generated. This subsystem was mainly to be used on 
shore but could in principle also be utilized by officers on 
the ships if they used a computer with internet access (see 
Fig. 1 for an example of the interface of the online analysis 
tool). The other subsystem was an onboard tool particularly 
customized for officers to be used during ship operations. It 
integrated various onboard systems and flowmeters to moni-
tor fuel and energy consumption and other parameters in real 
time. The main view on the onboard display showed how 
many litres or kilograms were consumed per hour or nauti-
cal miles, it also presented the average of these real-time 
measurements (Fig. 2). Another window displayed an auto-
matically built up fuel profile, similar to that in the systems’ 
analysis module, showing the vessel’s fuel consumption at 
different speeds.
The system was installed on two bridges, to start with, 
so that officers could access the real-time measurements 
during their work. Now officers could see, in detail, what 
they consumed and could analyze their practices with the 
help of advanced information technology and statistical 
tools. The system had been marketed as easy to use with a 
simple user interface. The managers hoped that the system 
would result in officers becoming more aware of the fuel 
consumption and thereby reduce it. However, to the surprise 
and disappointment of the managers, they soon discovered 
that the ships did not reduce their consumption as expected.
4  Professional autonomy, identity 
and boundaries between ship and shore 
communities
The initial reaction of the officers when the system was 
installed was to continue as usual and not to take a lot of 
notice of the system. The current practices had obviously 
worked so far (the ships were on time and passengers were 
happy) so why change them now? Some, however, also 
expressed more explicitly negative attitudes towards the 
system as recalled by an officer:
There were many that did not like this at all. Frankly, 
they did not give a [sh*t] about the system. Refused 
to use it, declaring that they will do it exactly as they 
always have done it (Deck officer).
The sense of autonomy was strong and highly valued in 
the community of practice onboard the ships. Historically, 
deck officers had always been responsible for many opera-
tional decisions. The nature of ship operations, being a safety 
critical enterprise where difficult situations requiring fast 
and apt decisions often arise, had rewarded self-sufficiency, 
autonomous professional judgements and competence within 
the onboard community to handle every situation in a safe 
manner. Suggestions or directions from managers and other 
shore-based personnel that lacked ship experience were thus 
perceived with skepticism and rejected on the grounds of not 
being based in the realities of seafaring.
The environmental manager, who was responsible for 
the implementation of the system explained that a frequent 
sarcastic comment she got from officers in the beginning of Fig. 1  Interface of the online analysis tool
Fig. 2  Interface of the onboard monitoring energy system
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the project was: “So are you trying to teach me how to drive 
my ship?” The boundary between the ‘onboard’ community 
of practice and the perceived ‘other’, i.e., ‘the shore-based 
manager’, thus created difficulties in influencing and shaping 
the operational practices for an outsider like the manager, 
given her non-participation in the onboard community.
Moreover, some officers saw the system as a surveillance 
tool and did not want to be ‘watched’ or ‘monitored’ which 
they interpreted as disempowering them. Many were also 
generally skeptical towards new instruments to be used 
based on the argument that they already had all the equip-
ment necessary to perform their work competently. However, 
the most essential of the initial difficulties of the energy-
saving ambition of the company was, according to the envi-
ronmental manager, that many officers were convinced that 
they already did everything they could to consume as lit-
tle fuel as possible and that the primary factors influencing 
consumption were located outside the control of the officers 
themselves.
The system was thus first interpreted as an unnecessary 
and provocative device implying that officers did not already 
perform their work in an optimal way and that there existed 
room for improvement in spite of many years of experience. 
This perceived implication was particularly offensive for 
older and more senior officers who had worked as seafar-
ers their whole adult lives and considered themselves to be 
professionals with sufficient knowledge to handle a ship in 
an optimal way. The challenge of implementing the system 
in practice to change the way officers performed their work, 
was thus not only that of making officers process some facts 
or figures about energy consumption but also involved pro-
fessional identity, sense of autonomy, understanding and 
embodied know-how as developed in the community of 
practice.
The environmental manager believed that although 
the system was optimal for the task of monitoring energy 
consumption (seen from a material perspective the system 
afforded all the actions required for energy performance 
monitoring) the more important challenge was to integrate 
the system and appropriate its features and functions in 
practice:
Now we have the best system in the world, but how 
should we work with it? (Environmental manager).
This experience of the initially failed attempt at imple-
menting the system forced the environmental manager to 
re-think her approach which she acknowledged had been 
too naïve. She expressed, somewhat self-ironically, that the 
initial strategy related to the implementation of the system 
had been based on a type of reasoning similar to the ques-
tionable belief that “if you just buy a bathroom scale with 
larger display you will automatically reduce your weight”. 
This initially adopted deterministic view of how technology 
changes organizational practices and skills was difficult to 
hold on to in light of the apparent inertia and absent use of 
the installed system. The environmental manager explained 
her insight by continuing the metaphor used previously:
If you are in denial you will not realize that you need 
to lose weight even if you have a bathroom scale (Envi-
ronmental manager).
The big question thus became how they could “make 
people accept the system and understand that they could 
make a difference only if they tried saving energy”. Given 
the strong community of practice onboard the ships, the 
environmental manager realized that her ambition of chang-
ing navigational practices to improve energy efficiency and 
implement energy-monitoring practices could not be per-
ceived as ‘requirements’ coming from a manager on shore. 
She thought that change would be more likely if the officers 
made themselves realize how to optimize their own prac-
tices rather than receiving instructions from shore. Being an 
environmental manger, she did not think she had the power 
and respect to encourage individual officers to navigate 
and maneuver in new ways that differed from the practices 
that had been developed from years of experience. How-
ever, if the suggestions came from a colleague onboard, she 
reasoned, they might be perceived as more legitimate and 
acceptable:
If I’ve said that the most optimal operational profile 
looks like this or that we would not have saved a single 
litre, but if the officers themselves could be made to 
see that for instance taking a slightly different route 
saves this much then it is possible to save a lot (Envi-
ronmental manager).
4.1  New implementation strategy: enrolling 
members from within the community 
of practice
The need to find a way of legitimizing the use of the sys-
tem, together with the apparently impervious community 
onboard, prompted the idea of gathering a small group 
with interested representatives from the ships that could be 
enrolled into the implementation project and act as advo-
cates for the system, “from the inside”. This was thought to 
enable an opening in the boundary between the community 
of navigational officers and the new system advocated by the 
shore office. The system was installed on two more ships and 
a project group was created with one officer from each of 
the four ships now equipped with the system. The task of the 
group was to find a way to address the skepticism and reluc-
tance to use the system and convince colleagues about the 
value of the technology and the possibility to create shared 
practices. The group started to have regular meetings and 
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discuss the system and how it could be practically applied. 
This resulted in a re-negotiation of old assumptions and 
taken for granted beliefs about fuel consumption that were 
seldom questioned by themselves and their colleagues. They 
made use of the monitoring system and scrutinized the accu-
mulated data and looked for trends to find some empirical 
ground for what and how work practices could be improved.
One such deeply ingrained assumption had for instance 
been that the only way of reducing the energy consumption 
was to reduce the average speed of the ships. The only way 
of doing this was to change the time table of the ships to 
introduce more slack in the schedule. This presumed fact 
was used by many officers as an argument that they could 
not do anything to improve the efficiency since the deci-
sion to change the time table essentially rested in the hands 
of the operational managers. The group of selected officers 
was soon able to demonstrate, using data from the system, 
that this was not necessarily the case. They saw that ships 
that operated with a generally higher average speed were 
not necessarily the ones that consumed the most fuel and 
the ships with the lowest average speed did not have the 
lowest fuel consumption. Instead, what seemed to play a 
more important role for fuel consumption was the manner in 
which maneuvers were performed. To reify this insight, the 
group was able to produce statistical graphs that compared 
two anonymized officers operating the same ship under sim-
ilar weather conditions on different occasions. The graph 
showed that although the average speed and distance sailed 
was the same for the two officers, one had consumed 92.4 L 
while the other had consumed 62.9 L, in total.
The mutual engagement and interaction between the 
officers in the project group created trust in the system 
and showed that energy could be saved by improving the 
maneuvers without compromising with the punctuality of 
the voyages. Based on a number of different analyses and 
findings, the group identified several operational measures 
that could be applied onboard the ships to improve energy 
efficiency. These included slow accelerations, utilization of 
bow thrusters, reducing speed earlier before berthing, avoid 
ship squatting in shallow waters, utilize sea currents, and 
reduce engine use at berth.
The re-negotiation of the meaning of the EMS and their 
own shared repertoire of assumptions, beliefs and practices 
enabled the officers in the project group to establish a legiti-
mate role for the system in the process of improving their 
operational procedures. The system assisted the group to 
construct and reify an argument for the value of the tech-
nology and an appealing proof of the potential for improve-
ment that could now be used in the dialog with the rest of 
the crew to illustrate “the impact that the driving style can 
have on the fuel consumption”. However, the growing par-
ticipation and reification in relation to the system was still 
bounded to the small project group. The challenge was still 
how to translate it into the definition of the joint enterprise 
and shared repertoire of the whole community of practice 
within the company.
4.2  Renegotiating the meaning of technology 
through mutual engagement and learning
The group compiled their conclusions from their work in a 
document but decided to also use a more pragmatic face-to-
face and personal approach in bringing it to their colleagues 
and initiated a series of training sessions where officers on 
each of the ships, together with representatives from the pro-
ject group (acting as boundary spanners between the ship 
and shore communities), could explore the possibilities of 
the EMS and learn from that collective effort during actual 
operation.
The training sessions were improvised each time but were 
generally arranged in the following fashion for each of the 
officers on the different ships: one of the officers from the 
project group (called moderator below) asked if he could 
come onboard to discuss the system with his colleague and 
illustrate how he used it and demonstrate what the project 
group had discovered could be improved. The officer on the 
ship was then first asked to maneuver and navigate as he 
always does without thinking about saving energy or the 
measurements shown on the system display. After approxi-
mately an hour of driving the officer was asked to do the 
same trip but this time try to apply some of the sugges-
tions derived from the discussion in the group or something 
else the officer on the ship suspected could reduce the fuel 
consumption. Then they logged into the system’s analytical 
program accessible via a PC with internet connection and 
compared the fuel consumption by marking the ship, geo-
graphical area and time duration in which the test had been 
performed to select the data relevant for comparison.
We tried different things and then went to the com-
puter to see the difference. We marked the voyages 
we wanted to compare and could see, with deciliter 
accuracy, the difference (Deck officer).
After each session (which was repeated two times) offic-
ers were requested to write a log on which measures had 
been tried and which would be tested the next session. The 
process of discussion and testing was similar to that which 
the project group had done and did indeed reveal many 
assumptions and habits that officers had and that could be 
questioned based on the data. Through this method officers 
could see directly how large or small the difference was in 
energy efficiency between the normal and test voyages. One 
of the officers from the project group explained that “very 
often we could see a difference of 20% and in one extreme 
case one officer improved by 40%”.
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One of the moderators from the project group who had 
done most of the ship visits was initially a bit worried 
about the reactions from his colleagues by this unfamiliar 
way of collaboration (normally officers did not explicitly 
comment on each other’s work) and did not want to be 
interpreted as a self-appointed ‘expert’ that came onboard 
to tell others how to do it right. Consequently, the modera-
tor was keen to enact a role which he identified more as 
an equal discussion partner trying to figure something out 
together with his colleague, rather than that of an instruc-
tor or teacher.
It was quite sensitive to me when I was around on 
the various boats. Met people with twice as much 
experience as I have. You had to be very humble and 
careful and say that I do not think I have the most 
correct way to do it but that my way has worked so 
I would like to introduce it to you. And at the same 
time learn from someone that has worked with this 
a long time. Not ‘now I will teach you’ but rather 
‘let’s discuss it together’. They often had things to 
say to me that I could think about. It never became a 
requirement, but everyone did what they felt they had 
the capacity to do (Deck officer/moderator).
The moderator considered it important not to give the 
impression of blaming colleagues but to create a positive 
feeling surrounding the possibility for improvement by 
demonstrating the potential in their own work. He told his 
colleagues that the system was an experimental tool with 
no requirements attached and that not all suggestions from 
the project group had to be adopted. The purpose was to 
explore the possibilities for improvement and reflect on 
their own practices, with the help of the system, rather 
than to enforce a particular procedure of how to use the 
system or how to navigate and maneuver more energy 
efficiently.
At the same time, the moderator had, as a member of the 
project group appointed by the environmental manager, a 
dual role as a broker between the community of the ‘shore-
managers’ and officers, rather than being a pure participant 
in the normal interaction between crew members. However, 
his full membership in the onboard community allowed him 
to successfully participate in the negotiation of the mean-
ing of the system and its application. This strategy evi-
dently succeeded since officers did not interpret the content 
of the training as coming from shore but as developed by 
colleagues.
We got no direct orders. Instead the whole project was 
based on discussions between us where we shared 
experiences (Deck officer).
We were encouraged to find ways to save energy 
instead of receiving directions (Deck officer).
Once officers could see the difference in fuel consumption 
during the peer-learning session they became much more 
positive to the system. However, participation and mutual 
engagement in communities of practice does not mean total 
agreement or consensus (Wenger 1998). Although no one 
criticized or opposed the peer-learning sessions per se, not 
everyone enthusiastically embraced all suggestions. A cru-
cial element in the training sessions was negotiating the 
meaning of the different operational measures and what they 
entailed or required in terms of effort and workload. Officers 
could, for instance, discuss whether a particular measure, or 
how often it was applied, was worth the mental concentra-
tion it required if it only saved a couple of decilitres of fuel 
per hour.
When you have been on your shift for many hours 
you don’t have the mental focus to make the perfect 
acceleration or the perfect maneuver all the time (Deck 
officer).
Nevertheless, soon even the initial skeptics were con-
vinced about the value of both the system and the possibil-
ity to improve the energy efficiency. As the interest grew 
and more officers had been convinced that opportunities for 
improvement did in fact exist it became harder to ignore the 
system. Officers explained that they did not want to appear 
as less competent than their colleagues or as if they did not 
have control over their own driving. Hence, a new norm of 
mutual accountability had been developed. As expressed by 
one officer:
I think many felt that if my colleague is interested in 
this then I don’t want to be left outside, and also that 
you could actually see the consumption of your col-
league when you start a new shift. You don’t want to 
be worse than your next mate (Deck officer).
Officers believed that the changes were a direct conse-
quence of the peer-learning session where particular tech-
niques and routines were discussed and analyzed. Some of 
the modifications in practice had been based on the sugges-
tions that the moderators and the project group had identi-
fied before the peer-learning sessions but most measures had 
been identified in the sessions by reasoning, analyzing and 
discussing things together and thus often included measures 
that had not been identified prior to the session by the group.
4.3  The effects: modifications in work practice
In 2017, the company had installed the system on all its ships 
and most officers had done the peer-learning. At that time, 
the company was annually saving between 20 and 25% fuel, 
compared to before the installation of the system and the peer-
learning. All interviewed officers believed that the system and 
the peer learning had contributed to this improvement. All 
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officers interviewed claimed that they had made modifica-
tions to their practices and changed many of their navigational 
routines and maneuvering techniques. As expressed by two 
officers:
I have developed a whole new way of navigating. It’s 
much more soft and calm” not as aggressive, you plan 
the maneuvers and berthing better now, instead of using 
everything [power available] no matter how the wind is 
I can now take the wind more into account earlier in my 
plan so I don’t have to use excessive force right before 
the wharf for example (Deck officer).
Before the system and the discussions we had, I always 
took that way around that island [officer pointing] but 
after the tests we could see that we could save a couple 
of litres by taking another route although it was longer in 
distance. I always take the cheaper way now but I never 
did it before the tests we did. Thanks to the tests I always 
think about the differences we found by evaluating the 
routes. It has affected me (Deck officer).
However, during the observations on the bridges it was also 
evident that few officers did actually use the system on a regu-
lar basis by integrating the real-time information from the sys-
tem in their maneuvering and navigational activities. Although 
the training sessions had resulted in many lasting navigational 
changes, no sign of persistent monitoring practices allowing 
further improvements could be observed. This was also con-
firmed in the interviews were most officers thought that the 
system had been useful in the discussions but less so in ordi-
nary work. Hence, outside the context of the peer-learning 
sessions, normal work took precedence. Moreover, many also 
believed that although the system had contributed to change 
the saliency of energy in the discourse among crew members, 
it was not the information per se that had enabled the change 
but rather the discussions and interactions that took place dur-
ing the project.
In sum, the peer-learning enabled the (temporary) enact-
ment of the system as a collaborative experimentation tool 
relevant for the work onboard rather than a management con-
trol tool. This enabled an interpretation of the system that was 
consistent with the officers’ self-conception and identity as 
competent professionals. Instead of seeing it as a technology 
that curtailed the autonomy and self-governance of officers it 
was made into a technology that emphasized officers’ auton-
omy, decision making and ability to analyze the functioning 
of complex technical systems.
5  Discussion and conclusions
The aim of this paper has been to contribute to the debate 
on energy efficiency and the need for better energy-
monitoring practices in shipping. It was argued that to 
understand the adoption and use of new technologies it is 
necessary to focus on the situated practices, relations and 
social meanings of the actors involved in particular imple-
mentation projects (Boudreau and Robey 2005; Chu and 
Robey 2008; Cousins and Robey 2005; Orlikowski 2000). 
To explore the performative (work-as-done), rather than 
the ostensive (work-as-imagined) definitions of technology 
adoption and use (Czarniawska 2014) it was necessary to 
conduct an interpretative case study, with a detailed con-
textual analysis and thick descriptions making the inter-
pretations “available in the consultable records” (Walsham 
1995).
Highlighting the research gap pertaining to how energy-
monitoring systems are implemented in shipping compa-
nies, this study addressed the role that communities of 
practice play in the social process of adopting information 
technology facilitating energy performance monitoring 
onboard ships. The concepts of negotiation of meaning 
and learning as developed in Wenger’s (1998) theory on 
communities of practice offered an explanation of how 
the socially situated process of adopting the energy-mon-
itoring system was mediated by officers’ participation and 
reification vis-á-vis the system and its affordances.
5.1  How are information technology 
(energy‑monitoring systems) adopted 
by practitioners (ship officers)?
The case study illustrates how the adoption of new tech-
nology in work practices is dependent on the enactment 
of a meaningful social context in which situated learning, 
involving both participation and reification, can take place, 
enabling an expansion and modification of the regime of 
competence and allowing new experiences and norms to 
enter the discourse. The mutual engagement and nego-
tiation of meaning within the community of practice was 
seen to open up the conceptual and material space for new 
practices, skills and norms to be developed. The situated 
learning enabled by the experimentations and reflections 
on practice and the EMS during the training sessions 
allowed an opening for the new artefact to enter the shared 
repertoire of the community of practice.
Consequently, officers did change their practices as 
a result of the meaningful social context enacted in the 
project group and peer-learning sessions. Before this 
context was created, the system was not enacted as a 
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technology-in-practice that made sense or fulfilled the per-
ceived purpose of the work. The meaning of the system 
was first interpreted by the officers as a control tool dimin-
ishing their power, authority and autonomy, thus posing 
a threat to their professional identity as both competent 
and self-sufficient. The value of the system was thus not 
considered high and few believed that it had any potential 
for improving the ship operations. Since neither energy 
management nor energy monitoring formed a part of the 
traditionally defined joint enterprise and shared repertoire 
onboard the ships, the initial challenge of implementing 
the system involved expanding the community’s concep-
tion of itself and its practices (as improvable). The ini-
tial efforts of implementation failed because it was not 
based in the social dynamic of the community of officers 
working onboard the ships. In particular, the traditional 
boundary between the ship and shore community did not 
allow a straightforward shore-based reconfiguration of 
the work practices onboard. The managerial attempt to 
manage energy-consuming behavior onboard by moni-
toring and control was met with resistance as a way of 
protesting against the transference of control from ship 
to shore. To maintain their autonomy (power) and iden-
tity, crew members could not let the definition of com-
petence be given away to the management and certainly 
not to some inanimate technology. To reframe the use of 
the system, as a tool assisting in work, and as an expres-
sion of the competence of officers, it had to be re-enacted 
from within the onboard community of practice as a legiti-
mate element in the officers’ joint enterprise and shared 
repertoire. However, for this to happen, officers had to 
engage in a process of situated learning where the mean-
ing of the EMS and their maneuvering and navigational 
practices was re-negotiated. The idea to gather a small 
group of officers and give them the authority to define the 
problem and explore the system was a first important step 
towards such a process. The group quickly felt a respon-
sibility and interest in exploring the significance of the 
system and the possibilities for improvement. The experi-
ence and knowledge created in the group was later utilized 
in the subsequent enrolment of the rest of the crew. This 
required, however, further negotiations and interactions 
between officers where various alternative maneuvering 
and navigational choices were compared and evaluated. 
The training sessions functioned as a socially legitimate 
arena in which colleague officers could explore how much 
could be saved by different changes rather than just adopt 
the results from some analysis made onshore. Here, the 
project group, and in particular the two peer-training mod-
erators, played an important role in legitimizing the system 
in the community. The use of the monitoring technology 
became legitimate (considered for inclusion in the shared 
repertoire) first when practitioners with full memberships 
in the community of practice started to engage colleagues 
and initiated a mutual negotiation about the system. The 
moderators’ role as boundary spanners (Levina and Vaast 
2005), crossing the boundary between the ship and shore 
community, made it possible for other officers to explore 
the system and become exposed to new experiences, thus 
expanding the current regime of competence in the com-
munity. The mutual engagement between the officers 
exploring the system in the individual sessions played a 
crucial role in envisioning what the system could become 
as a technology-in-practice (Orlikowski 2000).
The system, as enacted in the peer-training, made officers 
see the potential improvements in their own ways of navi-
gating and maneuvering and were thus convinced to see the 
value of the new technology. When officers began to realize 
that other colleagues were saving energy, their felt lack of 
knowledge became a potential threat of no longer belong-
ing, being a fully participating member, of the community. 
This, essentially motivated them to improve the energy effi-
ciency of their work. The adoption process of the system 
thus included a number of reifications (statistical calcula-
tions, production of documents with operational measures, 
writing a log of areas of improvement) and participations 
(project group meetings and collaborations, peer-learning 
sessions). Both types of elements were used to negotiate the 
meaning of the system. The process by which the system got 
entangled with the social interactions of officers not only 
changed their attitudes and beliefs about the system, it also 
changed their embodied and situated work practices.
Based on the findings, it can be concluded that successful 
energy-monitoring practices in shipping involve, not only the 
introduction of auto-logging monitoring systems, plans and 
explicit goals, but also, and more importantly, participation 
and engagement on the part of the practitioners constituting 
the communities of practice on which the management of 
energy depends. The results also show that the implementa-
tion of technology and change in work practice requires a 
focus on the social context, meanings and interpretations 
guiding practitioners as they perform their everyday work.
5.2  What role can EMS have in officers’ work 
and how can EMS facilitate decision making?
The case illustrates that rather than immediately contribut-
ing to officers’ decision making, EMS can play a mediat-
ing role in a negotiation of practice, eventually leading to 
improved operations. The information deficit model, under-
lying most research on energy monitoring, is based on a 
rationalist understanding of decision making where the right 
sort and amount of information will lead to more optimal 
decisions (Hargreaves 2018). This study suggests that rather 
than having this role, EMS can be expected to have implica-
tions for practices, not primarily because of its informational 
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properties but rather because of its social effects. This was 
illustrated by the finding that although the system did, even-
tually, have the desired effect of making energy consump-
tion more salient in the work of the officers, consequentially 
improving practice, it was evident that the effect was contin-
gent on the system being enacted as a relational mediator, 
allowing collective sense making of the information it gener-
ated. The system became a meaningful artefact in practice 
allowing an expansion of the regime of competence, as a 
result of the mutual engagement and interaction that was 
made possible through the creation of the project group and 
the peer-learning sessions. Outside of the temporary social 
context enacted in the training sessions, where a particular 
way of interacting with the system and colleagues emerged, 
the system was not used. This indicates that while an EMS 
can become a technology-in-practice in one social context, 
the informational affordances of the energy-monitoring sys-
tem do not necessarily emerge in all sociomaterial configu-
rations. It is, therefore, important to acknowledge that the 
potential of energy monitoring to reduce consumption does 
not only depend on the technical features (e.g., sub-metering, 
availability of valid and reliable data, interface design) of the 
systems acquired in companies, but also on the social pro-
cesses implicated in the adoption and use of the technology.
The findings in this study contribute to the literature on 
energy monitoring and feedback in shipping (Poulsen and 
Johnson 2016; Poulsen and Sornn-Friese 2015) as well and 
other workplace and organizational settings (Carrico and 
Riemer 2011; Siero et al. 1996). While most of the latter 
studies aim at investigating the quantifiable effect of moni-
toring and feedback on energy conservation behavior (with 
highly varying results) they have been mute on how moni-
toring systems become technologies-in-practice and have, 
therefore, failed to offer a deeper understanding of how any 
effects or changes in practice may arise. By focusing on 
either the technical or the behavioral potential, most studies 
neglect what (Bull and Janda 2018; Moezzi and Janda 2014) 
call social potential, i.e., the situated and participatory pro-
cess by which energy problems are defined and addressed. 
Similar to this notion, the energy efficiency potential in 
this case, as analyzed in the paper, was seen to be socially 
enacted; that is, it was neither embodied in the technology 
nor purely a matter of individual officers applying certain 
predefined measures, but rather a result of the participation 
and engagement among the practitioners (Orlikowski 2000).
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